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RUSSELL AND FREGE ON THE LOGIC OF FUNCTIONS
ABSTRACT: I compare Russell’s theory of mathematical func-
tions, the “descriptive functions” from Principia Mathematica ∗30,
with Frege’s well known account of functions as “unsaturated” en-
tities. Russell analyses functional terms with propositional func-
tions and the theory of definite descriptions. This is the primary
technical role of the theory of descriptions in PM . In Principles
of Mathematics and some unpublished writings from before 1905,
Russell offered explicit criticisms of Frege’s account of functions.
Consequenly, the theory of descriptions in “On Denoting” can be
seen as a crucial part of Russell’s larger logicist reduction of math-
ematics, as well as an excursion into the theory of reference.
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, with its accompanying no-
tions of scope and contextual definition, is justifiably still a leading the-
ory in the philosophy of language, over one hundred years since it was
first published in “On Denoting” in 1905. This theory was certainly an
early paradigm of analytic philosophy, and then, along with Frege’s the-
ory of sense and reference, became one of the two classical theories of
reference.2 “On Denoting” is now being studied from an historical point
of view as arising out of Russell’s qualms about his own prior theory
of denoting concepts. Like Frege’s theory of sense, however, the role
of the theory of descriptions in the larger logicist project is not well
understood. Frege’s theory of sense precedes his foundational work,
the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, by only a few years. Yet after the in-
troductory material, senses do not appear in the technical portion of
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Grundgesetze, which is occupied with the reference, or Bedeutung, in
the extensional logic of courses of values (Werthverlaufe) of concepts,
his logicist version of classes. Frege’s theory of sense, it seems, is jus-
tifiably foundational in the later development of the philosophy of lan-
guage, but is not so fundamental to his own life’s work, the project of
reducing mathematics to logic.
Russell’s theory of descriptions might seem to be similarly a digres-
sion into the philosophy of language by a philosopher whose main
project was to write a long book proving the principles of mathemat-
ics from definitions using symbolic logic. My project in this paper is to
explain one of the ways that definite descriptions enter into the techni-
cal project of Principia Mathematica, namely in ∗30 “Descriptive Func-
tions.” Descriptive functions are simply ordinary mathematical func-
tions such as the sine function, or addition. Number ∗30 is the origin of
the now familiar notion in elementary logic of eliminating functions in
favor of relations, and so is part of our conception of elementary logic as
ending with the logic of relations, with the addition of complex terms,
including function symbols, as an extra, optional development. I wish
to argue, however, that this familiar way of reducing logic with func-
tions to the logic of relations alone was in fact a step in Russell’s logicist
project, one which he took in self conscious opposition to Frege’s use
of mathematical functions as a primitive notion in his logic. As such
“descriptive functions” were important to Russell’s reduction of mathe-
matics to logic.
Definite descriptions have an important role in Russell’s theory of
propositions dating from Principles of Mathematics in 1903, where Rus-
sell uses the theory of denoting concepts which he only replaced in 1905
with the theory of “On Denoting.” Propositions in Principles, are com-
posed of “terms” which include individuals and denoting concepts. The
predicative constituents of propositions, the terms introduced by predi-
cates, when taken in extension, play the role of classes. These concepts,
obviously, are crucial to the logicist account of natural numbers and all
other entities that mathematics deals with. The subjects of propositions
will be individuals, when it is indeed individuals about which we make
judgements, but, more generally, denoting concepts, which enable us to
judge about terms with which we are not acquainted, such as infinite
classes, and, more familiar from “On Denoting”, non-existents, such
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as the round square or the present King of France. A proper account
of definite descriptions, as a special sort of denoting concept, is, then,
appropriate in Russell’s preliminary, foundational, thinking about the
logic to which mathematics is to be reduced. Though appropriate in an
account of fundamental notions of logic, however, an account of defi-
nite descriptions is not central to the technical development of Principia
Mathematica, which came to be based on the concept of propositional
function, rather than the propositions which are the center of attention
in Principles of Mathematics.
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is also important for the
project of Principia as a model of the technique of contextual defini-
tion which is used there in ∗20 “Classes,” to reduce classes to propo-
sitional functions. The theory of descriptions in ∗12 is based on a pair
of contextual definitions, which allow the elimination of expressions for




x)φx] .ψ( ιx)φx .= : (∃b) : φx . ≡x . x = b :ψb Df
This can be paraphrased as saying that pthe φ isψq means the same
as pThere is a b such that anything x is φ if and only if that x is iden-
tical with b, and that b is ψq. Here ψ is the context from which the
description (
ι
x)φx is to be eliminated. That this is the “scope” of the
description is indicated by the prefixed occurrence of the description
in square brackets: [( ιx)φx] . This definition allows the replacement
of formulas in which definite descriptions appear is subject position. A
further contextual definition is provided for the occurrence of descrip-
tions as, E!(
ι
x)φx , which expresses the assertion that a description is
“proper”, that is, that is that there is exactly one φ.
The second way in which the theory of definite descriptions enters
into the logicist reduction of mathematics in Principia Mathematica, is as
a model for the similar contextual definition of class expressions. Just
as the definitions of ∗14 allow for the elimination of definite descrip-
tions from different contexts, so the theory of classes in ∗20 is based
on a series of contextual definitions. Occurrences of class expressions
pẑ(ψz)q, read as “the class of z which are ψ”, can be eliminated from
contexts f via the primary definition:
∗20·01 f {ẑ(ψz)}.= : (∃φ) :φ!x . ≡x .ψx : f {φ!ẑ} Df
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To say that the class ẑ(ψz) is f is to say that there is some (pred-
icative) function φ which is coextensive with ψ which is f . There is
no explicit mention of scope, but in all regards this definition closely
copies that of definite descriptions.3 The definition of class expressions
is completed by a series of other definitions, including those which use
variables that range over classes, the “greek letters” such as α, which
are used as bound (apparent) and free (real) variables for classes. To-
gether, the definitions of ∗20 provide a reduction of the theory of classes
to the theory of propositional functions. One immediate consequence of
this definition is that a solution for Russell’s paradox is provided by the
restrictions of the theory of types. The “class of all classes that are not
members of themselves”, upon analysis, requires a function to apply to
another function of the same type, which is prohibited by the theory of
types. (See my Linsky 2002.) While this “no-classes” theory of classes
succeeds in resolving the paradoxes via the elimination of talk of classes
in favor of talk about propositional functions, it is precisely at this point
that we part ways with the now standard, alternative, project of found-
ing mathematics on axiomatic set theory. Rather than rely on the notion
of propositional function to explain classes, philosophers who favor ax-
iomatic set theory prefer the first order theory of sets, as formulated in
one of the standard axiomatic theories such as that of Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory with the Axiom of Choice, ZFC. Propositional functions, it is
felt, are obscure, and not even presented as familiar mathematical func-
tions from arguments to propositions.
The next section of Principia Mathematica, ∗21 “General Theory of
Relations” presents the extension of the “no-classes” theory to the cor-
responding notion for binary relations, the theory of “relations in ex-
tension.” By analogy with the way the no-classes theory of ∗20 de-
fines a class expression ẑ(ψz) using a contextual definition, in ∗21 we
are given contextual definitions for eliminating expressions of the form
x̂ ŷ ψ(x , y), which represents the “relation in extension” which holds
between x and y when ψ(x , y) obtains:
∗21·01. f { x̂ ŷ ψ(x , y)} . =
: (∃φ):φ ! (x , y) .≡x ,y .ψ(x , y) : f {φ ! (û, v̂)} Df
The relation of x bearing ψ to y has the property f just in case some
predicative function φ , which is coextensive with ψ has the property
f . From ∗21 on “Capital Latin Letters”, i.e. ‘R’, ‘S’, ‘T’, etc., are reserved
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for these relations in extension. They are variables, replaced by such
expressions as x̂ ŷ ψ ! (x , y), “just”, Whitehead and Russell say, “. . . as
we used Greek letters for variable expressions of the form ẑ(φ !z).” (PM
201) These new symbols for relations in extension are written between
variables, as in xRy or uSv. A propositional function would precede
the variables, as in φ(x , y). (It is not clear how this notation for rela-
tions in extension would be extended to three or four place relations.
Indeed in general below, as when talking about the analysis of relations
in terms of sets of ordered pairs, the discussion will always be restricted
to binary relations.) It should be noted, as Quine has observed, that the
intensional propositional functions represented by φ, and ψ, etc., drop
out here from the development of Principia Mathematica, and that from
this point on we only encounter relations in extension, symbolized by
‘R’, ‘S’, ‘T’, etc. (Quine 1963, 251).
Definite descriptions, though of course very important to the later
development of the philosophy of language, do not appear explicitly in
the later sections of PM where in fact the work of reducing mathematics
to logic is really carried out. In fact it is after ∗30·01 that description
operators, the familiar “rotated iotas”, disappear, having, I would argue,
performed their most important technical function. We are now ready
for the third way in which the theory of definite descriptions enters into
the logicist project of Principia Mathematica, as key to the definition of
“Descriptive Functions”, the topic of this paper. This takes the form of
yet another definition, in this case of the expression R‘y , to be read as
“the R of y”:
∗30·01. R‘y = (
ι
x) xRy Df
The expression R‘y is defined by the definite description, ( ιx) xRy .
If xRy means “x is father of y” then R‘y is “the x such that x is father
of y”, or “the father of y”. As Whitehead and Russell point out, this
definition is not a contextual definition, which shows how expression
R‘y is to be eliminated from a context, such as ψ(R‘y), but simply as an
explicit instruction about the replacement of symbols R‘, wherever they
occur. The notion of “descriptive function” provides an analysis of the
ubiquitous “mathematical functions” of arithmetic and analysis which
are reduced in later numbers of Principia Mathematica. Whitehead and
Russell say:
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The functions hitherto considered, with the exception of a
few particular functions such as α ∩ β , have been propo-
sitional, i.e. have had propositions for their values. But
the ordinary functions of mathematics, such as x2, sin x ,
log x , are not propositional. Functions of this kind al-
ways mean “the term having such and such a relation to
x .” For this reason they may be called descriptive functions,
because they describe a certain term by means of its relation
to their argument. Thus “sin π/2” describes the number 1;
yet propositions in which sin π/2 occurs are not the same
as they would be if 1 were substituted for sin π/2. This
appears, e.g. from the proposition “sin π/2 = 1,” which
conveys valuable information, whereas “1 = 1” is trivial.
Descriptive functions, like descriptions in general, have no
meaning by themselves, but only as constituents of propo-
sitions. (PM, 231)
Descriptive functions provide Principia Mathematica’s analysis of math-
ematical functions, a Logicist analysis in terms of the logical notions of
relation in extension and definite descriptions. It has been said that
Frege “mathematicized” logic in preparation for his analysis of arith-
metic.4 That mathematization involved not only the invention of sym-
bolic logic, but also reliance on the mathematical notion of function as
a primitive notion in his logic. Concepts are functions from objects to
truth values. Frege’s notion of the extension of a concept is its course
of values, which is a notion that applies to all functions. The notion
of course of values is centrally implicated in Russell’s paradox, and so
is seen, like Whitehead and Russell’s theory, as one of the unsuccessful
logicist attempts to avoid postulating sets as primitive, mathematical,
entities. The account of descriptive functions in ∗30 thus brings out
clearly, some might think, the primary objections to Whitehead and Rus-
sell’s version of logicism. It relies on notions much better understood
within the mathematical theory of sets, it is thought. A function, on this
account, is simply as set of ordered pairs, ordered pairs themselves be-
ing sets of a certain sort, and a propositional function would be a func-
tion from arguments to propositions. As propositions are not needed
for the extensional, first order, logic in which axiomatic set theory is
formulated, ∗30 thus epitomizes the wrong path taken by Whitehead
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and Russell’s version of logicism.
However, I would like to suggest that an examination of the de-
velopment of the idea of function in logic from Frege and Russell on
into the early part of the twentieth century will defend the notion of
descriptive function as a successful way of reducing the mathematical
notion of function to logical notions alone. With the exception of a few
remarks, from Russell’s notes on Frege’s works, and his unpublished
paper “On Meaning and Denotation” from 1903, this review relies on
material in Principles of Mathematics and its Appendix A, “On the Doc-
trines of Frege”, but presented with a different emphasis than is usual.
In particular, the emphasis will be on customary mathematical functions
such as the sine function, or addition, and their reduction in axiomatic
set theory to sets of ordered pairs, and less with the more idiosyncratic
sorts of functions, such as concepts and propositional functions.
Frege on Functions
While it is correct to say that Frege relies on the notion of mathemat-
ical function as a primitive, that is not to say that he did not provide
a famously original and ground breaking logical analysis of function
expressions and variables. Frege’s 1891 paper “Function and Concept”
and most explicitly his 1904 paper “What is a Function?” talk about
the mathematical notion of function, of which concepts are a special
case. Frege explains the nature of variables as being linguistic entities
which may be assigned different values and not as signs of “variable
quantities” as many had confusedly described them to be. Frege’s fur-
ther notion of concepts as “unsaturated entities” which are completed
by objects and yield truth values is well known. A function in general,
and mathematical functions among them, will also refer to unsaturated
entities which yield objects as values. A function expression, then, such
as sin x , x2, and log x will have as its Bedeutung, or reference an unsat-
urated entity which, when applied to a number as argument, yields a
number as value. The logical status of expressions for functions is that
they are “incomplete” names for numbers. Just as Frege had problems
in even naming concepts such as “the concept horse”, similarly there
is a difficulty with naming functions.5 In fact the sine function ought
to be expressed somehow as ‘sin( )’ with a blank or hole to indicate
its unsaturated nature. The expression ‘sin x ’ really expresses a given
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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number, the value of the function, for each assignment of a number to
the variable x . It is clear from the discussion of the problem of naming
concepts that Frege would have rejected Church’s lambda notation as
a way of naming functions, for example, with ‘λx sin x ’ as naming the
sine function.
Russell’s views on this “concept horse” problem are in the Appendix
to Principles of Mathematics. In §481 Russell agrees with Frege that it
is just “. . . some terms can only occur as subjects. . . ", in opposition to
Kerry’s view that “Begriffe also can occur as subjects . . . ”, but goes on
to disagree with the further claim that they are subjects standing “in the
same relation” to their predicates.
But he [Frege] goes on to make a second point that appears
mistaken. We can, he says, have a concept falling under
a higher one (as Socrates falls under man, he means, not
as Greek falls under man): but in such cases, it is not the
concept itself, but its name, that is in question (BuG. p.
195). “The concept horse,” he says, is not a concept, but
a thing; the peculiar use is indicated by inverted commas
(ib. p.196). But a few pages later he makes statements
which seem to involve a different view. A concept, he says,
is essentially predicative even when something is asserted
of it: an assertion which can be made of a concept does not
fit an object. When a thing is said to fall under a concept,
and when a concept is said to fall under a higher concept,
the two relations involved, though similar, are not the same
(ib. p.201). It is difficult to me to reconcile these remarks
with those of p.195; but I shall return to this point shortly.
(PoM, 507)
On the next page Russell discusses what is essentially the difference
in logical type between objects and concepts:
Another point of difference from Frege, in which, however,
he appears in the right, lies in the fact that I place no re-
striction upon the variation of the variable, whereas Frege,
according to the nature of the function, confines the vari-
able to things, functions of the first order of one variable,
functions of the first order with two variables, functions of
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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the second order with one variable, and so on. There are
thus for him an infinite number of different kinds of vari-
ability. This arises from the fact that he regards as distinct
the concept occuring as such and the concept occurring as
term, which I (§49) have identified. For me, the functions,
which cannot be values of variables in functions of the first
order, are non-entities and false abstractions. (PoM, 508-9)
Russell’s remark that Frege is “in the right” on this issue has to do
with the division of propositional functions into types. Russell says that
“The contradiction discussed in Chapter X seems to show that some
mystery lurks in the variation of propositional functions; but for the
present Frege’s theory of different kinds of variables must, I think, be
accepted.” (PoM, 510).
Russell returns to the “concept horse problem” in §483, arguing that
Frege is simply wrong, and that concepts can be subjects of proposi-
tions. He says:
Frege, it may be observed, does not seem to have clearly dis-
entangled the logical and linguistic elements of naming: the
former depend upon denoting, and have, I think, a much
more restricted range than Frege allows them. (PoM, 510)
This is a long way from the contemporary view that functions are
simply sets of ordered pairs. In his Introduction to Mathematical Logic,
Alonzo Church manages to turn Frege’s view into the current standard
current view on the logical syntax of function expressions and terms.
Church avoids Frege’s talk of function expressions having as a reference
(Bedeutung) some unsaturated (and un-nameable) entity, which, when
saturated by an argument, gives a value. Instead we find:
If we suppose the language fixed, every singulary form (func-
tion expression) has corresponding to it a function f (which
we will call the associated function of the form) by the rule
that the value of f for an argument x is the same as the
value of the form for the value x of the free variable of the
form . . . (Church 1956, 19)
This account avoids the expressions “denoted” or “designates”, in-
stead using the neutral “corresponding to”, and “associated with”. Church
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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wishes to explain the semantics of function expressions without running
afoul of Frege’s “concept horse” problem by saying that functional ex-
pressions name functions. But this is Frege’s account of the semantics.
Church, and those after him for some time, took the difference in kind
between functions and objects, as a difference of logical type. It was
only in the late 1930s that, following Quine, it became standard to view
logic as first order logic, and relations and functions, via their reduction
to sets of ordered pairs, as themselves just objects.6
If we look carefully at Basic Law V of the Grundgesetze, the law
that leads to the paradox, we see that it is actually about functions in
general:
⊢ (ὲ f (ε) = ὰg(α)) = (∀a f (a) = g(a))
The expression ὲ f (ε) has as Bedeutung or referent, the Werthverlauf,
or “course of values” of the function f . Basic Law V thus says that the
course of values of f is the same as the course of values of the function
g just in case the values of f and g are the same for every argument
a. In the case that f is a function from objects to truth values, and
so a concept, the course of values is naturally seen as the extension of
the concept, as a class. But for any other sort of function, the course
of values is an object, like the graph of the function, the set of pairs of
arguments and values. For the special case of concepts, Basic Law V
does say that extensions are the same when concepts are coextensive.
It is natural, then, that Russell saw (mathematical) functions as figuring
prominently in Frege’s account of terms and so in his logic.
Function expressions for Frege will have a sense as well, although
he does not discuss this in much detail. That sense will provide a con-
nection between the argument of a function and its value, presumably,
in the way that the sense of a name provides a “route to the reference”
of the name. While mathematical functions simply map numbers onto
numbers, there is still some notion of the connection between the two,
as embodied in the sense of the function expression. Russell, in the
margin of Grundgesetze §2 writes “What is the Sinn of ξ2 = 4? This is
a most puzzling question.”7
It is possible that the notion of the sense of an equation may be at
the heart of Frege’s use of the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction in logic. For
if a functional term expression like ‘ξ2’ simply has as its Bedeutung the
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value of a function for an argument, thus for the argument 2 the ex-
pression ‘22’ is simply another name for 2, and, furthermore there is no
trace of the argument (or function) in the value, 4, then the equation
‘22 = 4’ is a trivial identity. ‘22 = 4’ is then not different from ‘4 = 4.’
If expressions such as ‘22 = 4’ are to be derived from logical principles
alone, and this is to reveal something about the status of arithmetical
truths, then there must be more to the derivations than a string of self
identities (or names for the True, which is, after all, the Bedeutung of
each logical truth). So, one might see the attention to identity sen-
tences at the beginning of “Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung” as not just an
sample of a problem picked almost at random, the attention being on
the replacement of names with the same reference in sentences ‘a =
. . . ’, but really as directed at identities, as important to the theory of
mathematical functions, and so for a defense of the epistemological in-
terest in mathematics, if it is indeed devoted to sentences and other
expressions with the Bedeutung that Frege says they have. Oddly, then,
Russell’s seemingly naive question, “What is the Sinn of ξ2 = 4?”, gets
at the very point of the theory of sense, to justify the account of function
expressions, that Frege relied on.
In any case, then, however it is that Frege provides a logical analysis
of functions, including both his notion of unsaturated entities, and the
notion of sense, this account is in aid of understanding the functions
with which mathematicians were already familiar.
Russell’s criticisms of Frege
There is little direct textual support for my thesis that Russell’s dissatis-
faction with Frege’s notion of function was due to its being insufficiently
logicist. In Russell’s early writings there is little attention to a demarca-
tion between logic and mathematics, or attention to whether a notion
is logical or not.8 Instead, Russell’s attention is always on finding the
proper logical analysis of a notion, so that any successful analysis is au-
tomatically a logicist account. There are objections to Frege’s theory of
functions, however, expressed in Appendix A to Principles of Mathemat-
ics, and they can be read in this light. Thus we have:
The fundamental case is that where our unity is a proposi-
tional concept. From this is derived the usual mathematical
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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notion of a function, which might at first sight seem simpler.
If f (x) is not a propositional function, its value for a given
value of x ( f (x) being assumed to be one-valued) is the
term y satisfying the propositional function y = f (x), i.e.
satisfying, for the given value of x , some relational proposi-
tion; this relational proposition is involved in the definition
of f (x), and some such propositional function is required
in the definition of any function which is not propositional.
(PoM, 508)
Russell here asserts that the notion of denoting, and hence of de-
scriptive function, is presupposed in the mathematical notion of a func-
tion in the expression of the value of a function. Specific criticisms of
the account of functions follow on the next page:
Frege’s general definition of a function, which is also in-
tended to cover also functions which are not propositional,
may be shown to be inadequate by considering what may
be called the identical function, i.e.x as a function of x . If
we follow Frege’s advice, and remove x in hopes of hav-
ing the function left, we find that nothing is left at all; yet
nothing is not the meaning of the identical function. (PoM,
509)
The objection is that Frege’s metaphor for incompleteness, the gap
in a denoting expression cannot account for the identity function, which
takes x as an argument and returns x as a value. An equation, ‘ f (x) =
x ’ can express such a function, but an expression directly denoting the
value, with the argument deleted. But, Russell argues, equations pre-
suppose a denoting concept, “the” value of a function. Russell continues
his criticisms further on that page:
Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument
is to be inserted indicated in some way; thus he says that in
2x3 + x the function is 2( )3 + ( ) But here his requirement
that the two empty places be filled by the same letter can-
not be indicated; there is no way of distinguishing what we
mean from the function involved in 2x3 + y . (PoM, 509)
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Frege’s talk of expressions for functions as incomplete, suggested by
a hole or empty spot, doesn’t explain the role of variables in function
expressions. Later, with Church’s lambda calculus, it was clear that the
variables in functional expressions are to be seen as bound variables.
λx 2x3 + x is clearly distinguished from λxλy 2x3 + y . There is more
to the logical analysis of function expressions than the unsaturatedness
of functions.9
The fact seems to be that we want the notion of any term of
a certain class, and that this is what our empty places really
stand for. The relation, as a single entity, is the relation (6)
. . . above [the relation of the member of the class . . . to the
value which the variable has in that member]; we can then
consider any relatum of this relation, or the assertion of all
or some of the relata, and any relation can be expressed in
terms of the corresponding referent, as “Socrates is a man”
is expressed in terms of Socrates. But the usual formal ap-
paratus of the calculus of relations cannot be employed, be-
cause it presupposes propositional functions. We may say
that a propositional function is a many-one relation which
has all terms for the class of its referents, and has its relata
contained among propositions: or, if we prefer, we may call
the class of relata of such a relation a propositional func-
tion. But the air of formal definition about these statements
is fallacious, since propositional functions are presupposed
in defining the class of referents and relata of a relation.
(PoM, 509)
Russell here objects to saying that propositional functions are func-
tions from individuals to propositions, on the grounds that that is a cir-
cular account, “since propositional functions are presupposed in defin-
ing the class of referents and relata of a relation.” But he also suggests
that the explanation of variables in functions expressions involves de-
noting as well. The “empty places” in a function expression really stand
for “any term” of a certain class. “Any” is one of the class of denot-
ing expressions analyzed in “On Denoting”, with variables themselves
remaining as among the last, unanalyzed, denoting expressions when
definite and indefinite descriptions have been eliminated. Russell here
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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argues that the role of variables in function expressions is understood if
they are analyzed using propositional functions.
Since Frege holds that function expressions are simply incomplete
denoting expressions, we can also look to Russell’s objections to Frege’s
theory of descriptions and other “denoting expressions” in “On Denot-
ing” and elsewhere to see his other objections. Aside from the prob-
lems of the “Gray’s Elegy” argument, which seem to have something to
do with the problem of referring to functions, the main problem with
Frege’s view is the difficulties with improper descriptions. In fact, as I
have argued with F.J. Pelletier (Pelletier & Linsky 2005), it is not clear
which of four different theories of improper descriptions is Frege’s offi-
cial view. Thus I would conclude that despite the accomplishments of
Frege’s papers in explaining the logical status of function expressions,
it was Russell’s dissatisfaction with that very analysis, centering on the
problem of improper descriptions, that embodies his objections to the
priority, or primitive status, of mathematical functions.
Rather than simply giving an account of partial functions, so that
‘dividing by 0’ is treated like referring to the present king of France,
in fact the notion of descriptive function plays a more important role
in Russell’s logicism, in that it allows the reduction of a mathemat-
ical notion, still primitive in Frege’s work, to logical notions. While
perhaps puzzling to our eyes, when compared with mathematical func-
tions, Russell’s propositional functions were central to his logic, and so,
I will argue, central to his logicism.
Russell’s views about the relation between mathematical functions
and propositional functions, or relations, are not primarily driven by a
reaction to Frege. They seem to have been independently motivated
and to have been developed before Russell’s more careful encounter
with Frege in the summer of 1902. Consider the following from “On
Meaning and Denotation", from 1903:
If we take denoting to be fundamental, the natural way
to assert a many-one relation will not be xRy but y = φx .
This, of course, is the usual mathematical way; and there is
much to be said for it. All the ordinary functions, such as
x2, sin x , log x , etc., seem to occur more naturally in this
form than as ιR̆|x . Again, in ordinary language, “y is the
father of x” clearly states an identity, not a relation: it is “y
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= the father of x”. (CP4, 340)
But if we take propositional functions to be fundamental
– as I have always done, first consciously and then uncon-
sciously – we must proceed through relations to get to or-
dinary functions. For then we start with ordinary functions
such as “x is a man”; these are originally the only func-
tions of one variable. To get at functions of another sort,
we have to pass through xRy; but then, with ι, we get all
the problems of denoting. And, as we have seen, a a form
of denoting more difficult than
ι
is involved in the use of
variables to start with. Thus denoting seems impossible to
escape from. (CP4, 340)
So, Russell does see propositional functions, or rather, relations, as
more fundamental than mathematical functions. Indeed, he adopted
this position so surely that it became “unconscious” at some point.
However, Russell sees the move to relations as problematic, requiring
a proper account of denoting. So, although Russell may have found
propositional functions to be more basic than mathematical functions,
until he solved the problem of denoting, (in “On Denoting” in 1905),
he was not justified in thinking that he had explained the less obvious
in terms of the more basic, instead the reduction of mathematical func-
tions led directly to his big problem that concerned him in those days,
the problem of denoting.
With a proper theory of denoting, in particular, the theory of descrip-
tions of ∗12 of Principia Mathematica, in hand, Whitehead and Russell
are then ready to complete the logicist analysis of mathematical func-
tions as “descriptive functions” in ∗30.
Notes
1Thanks to Allen Hazen, James Levine, Paul Oppenheimer and Ed Zalta for discussions
of the paper, and to the participants in the Riga conference, in particular my co-symposi-
asts James Levine and Mike Beaney. A companion essay, “From Descriptive Functions
to Sets of Ordered Pairs”, was presented at the 31st International Wittgenstein Sympo-
sium in August 2008, and in the volume Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the
Sciences, Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb eds., Ontos Verlag, 2009.
2Ramsey (1931, 263 n) first called it a “paradigm of Philosophy”.
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3Leon Chwistek paid attention to the role of scope in the no-classes theory and dis-
cussed it in his paper “The Theory of Constructive Types”, see my (Linsky 2009)
4As by Burton Dreben, according to Peter Hylton (1993, n. 28).
5Frege introduces this problem in “Function and Concept”, (Frege 1891, 196).
6See (Mancosu 2005, 335-9).
7See (Linsky 2004, 14).
8Thus his first reaction to seeing Frege’s analysis of the ancestral in purely logical terms
was simply to call it “. . . ingenious: it is better than Peano’s induction.” (Linsky 2004-5,
137). Thus what we see as a logicist account of induction to the inheritance of hereditary
properties was described by Russell as merely better than assuming an axiom of induction.
Still, Russell adopted Frege’s analysis immediately, and later described it as an essential
step in the logicist program.
9Philip Ebert has pointed out that in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the Greek letters ξ and ζ
for just this purpose. Indeed Russell copies this notation in his question “What is the Sinn
of ξ2 = 4?”. Clearly Russell is criticizing the use of parentheses around a blank space in
“Function and Concept”, and making the point that the notion of unsaturatedness alone
will not account for all the properties of functions of several arguments.
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